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Herding in Multi-winner Auctions 












Herding behavior is widely observed in auctions. There are rational reasons for herding but 
herding can also be counterproductive. We found evidence of herding behavior and sub-optimal 
outcome in a multi-winner auction setting. This study adds to the knowledge of herding by looking 
at herding in an auction setting where there is extra incentive to herd (multi-winner auction). Our 
findings reconfirm evidence in previous research about strategic usage of herding that diminishes 
after certain threshold; in addition, our findings indicate sub-optimal outcomes of herding 
behavior which include unjustified risk-return ratio, low ROI, wasted investment opportunities, 
and underutilized resource. 
Keywords:  Herding, information cascades, P2P lending, online auction, E-business 
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Introduction 
Information technologies have made online auctions a convenient and economic way for doing business. On one 
hand, online auctions are characterized by their openness and sequential choice setting where everyone can see what 
choices everyone else ahead of them has made. On the other hand, online marketplaces are characterized by 
anonymity and uncertainty. Buyers commonly have to make purchase decisions without accurate or reliable 
information about the sellers and their products. A commonly employed strategy is following the choices others 
have made (Duan, Gu, and Whinston 2009; Huang and Chen 2006; Simonsohn and Ariely 2008). Such herding 
behavior can be rational in situations characterized by information asymmetry such as in an electronic marketplace 
(Duan et al. 2009). However, if buyers overly rely on the behaviors of other buyers and disregard important signals 
from the seller and product, herding can lead to inferior purchase decisions (Dholakia and Soltysinski 2001; 
Dholakia, Basuroy, and Soltysinski 2002; Simonsohn and Ariely 2008). 
P2P lending websites create an online platform to connect lenders who have money to invest and borrowers who 
need to borrow money. P2P lending auctions are unique in that in most cases multiple lenders are needed to finance 
one loan. Previous research finds evidence of herding behavior in P2P lending to be strategic and diminishing after a 
certain point (Herzenstein, Dholakia, and Andrews 2010). We report preliminary analysis of herding behavior in 
P2P lending with respect to listing options and timing. Our study provides evidence of herding behavior in P2P 
lending that might lead to low ROI, high risk-return ratio, and under-utilized lender money resource.  
Theoretical Background 
Herding in Multi-winner Auctions 
It is difficult to precisely define herding. Devenow and Welch (1996) pointed out that in its most general form, 
herding could be defined as behavior patterns that are correlated across individuals, but such behavior patterns could 
be due to correlated information arrival in independently acting individuals. The type of herding behavior that is 
most interesting to researchers and widely studied in stock trading and online auctions (e.g., Simonsohn and Ariely 
2008) is caused by informational cascades. Informational cascades occur “when it is optimal for an individual, 
having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard 
to his own information” (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992, p.994). Banerjee (1992) defines herding 
behavior as “everyone doing what everyone else is doing, even when their private information suggests doing 
something quite different.” It is interesting to look at why people follow others and ignore what their private 
information suggests, and the consequences of this behavior. Our study examines this herding behavior in the 
context of P2P lending. 
On a P2P lending Web site, borrowers post loan request listings (auctions) with the amount of money requested and 
the interest rate for the loan. Interested lenders bid on particular listings with the amount of money they are willing 
to offer individually, often much less than the amount requested. If the total amount offered by lenders exceeds the 
amount requested on the listing, lenders start to bid down the interest rate the borrower has to pay. All lenders 
winning the auction earn the same interest rate decided at the end of the auction. A listing only proceeds to loan 
creation if the requested amount is fully funded. As P2P lenders often bid only a small amount (as small as $25) on 
each listing to lower overall portfolio risk, in most cases, multiple lenders are needed for each listing to be fully 
funded. Although such can happen that one lender funds the entire loan, these cases are rare. For the sake of 
discussion, we disregard the rare cases where a single lender funds the entire loan as they are not of interest here. 
The facts that individually lenders only buy a proportion of the listing and that a listing has to be fully funded 
otherwise there will be no winner of the auction requests that multiple bidders have to win the auction together, we 
call this “multi-winner” auction. This distinct property of P2P lending auctions has unique implications on herding 
behavior in that on top of everything else, bidders are motivated to herd to improve the chance of winning as a 
group. We look at causes for herding next. 
Reasons for Herding  
It is easy to observe what peers are doing on e-Commerce marketplaces. For instance, people can watch how prices 
and the number of bids change as they happen at real-time at eBay auctions. Likewise, P2P lending marketplaces 
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make it very easy to see what other lenders have decided about particular listings. For instance, on Prosper (a major 
U.S. based P2P lending marketplace), bidding status is clearly displayed on each loan listing. The number of bids, 
the percentage of the requested amount that has been accounted for, and the time left before the listing expires are all 
available at a glance of the top section of each listing. In addition, all lenders who placed bids are listed including 
the bid amount and interest rate offered. 
Herding behavior has been associated with search cost (Lin, Tsai, and Sun 2010). When the uncertainty about 
returns and risks are high, to lower search cost, investors are motivated to follow other investors’ choices, with the 
assumption that the observed choices are based on relevant information processing. Lenders incur search cost when 
looking for attractive investment options and comparing listings on various aspects. Due to the reach of Internet 
markets, the number of borrowers and listings on P2P lending marketplaces are overwhelming. Choosing among 
similar listings based on interest rate, information of individual borrowers’ credit and social capital, and the reasons 
they borrow can be very time consuming and difficult. Under this situation, following what other lenders have 
chosen is a very practical approach. 
Lenders incur opportunity cost when the money invested is lost on defaulted loans (type I), or when the money is 
locked in the listing awaiting the auction to end earning no interest (type II). Type II opportunity cost is inevitable 
but it gets compensated from the interest earned in the future if a loan is created. If no loan is created (the listing is 
not fully funded), then the opportunity cost gets no compensation at all. Therefore, lenders want to bid on listings 
that have a good chance to get fully funded. When everything else is the same, listings that are closer to getting fully 
funded are more attractive than listings that are less close to getting fully funded. Consequently, we expect to see 
bidding activities increase with the percentage funded of a listing. Timewise, we expect to see bidding activities 
increase toward the end of an auction on timed auctions (i.e., auctions that have a fixed auction length and won’t 
close as soon as the listing amount is fulfilled), as the waiting time is shorter and hence less type II opportunity cost. 
Consequences of Herding  
Herding is a widely employed practical strategy, it may help reduce search cost and opportunity cost. It has been 
shown theoretically and empirically that herding can be counterproductive when observers follow choices that have 
already lost their advantage, such as a low starting price on eBay. For instance, buyers on eBay may end up paying 
higher prices or having a smaller chance to win an auction at the same price level (Simonsohn and Ariely, 2008). In 
the context of P2P lending, Herzenstein et al. (2010) finds that in contrast to eBay buyers, P2P lenders benefit from 
herding by strategically herding over listings with more bids up to the point where they get fully funded. Our 
preliminary investigation of P2P lending auctions revealed some possible negative consequences of herding such as 
less than optimal risk-return ratio, wasted investment opportunity, and wasted resource of lender money. We also 
found increased herding behavior toward the end of P2P auctions, which calls for further investigation for its 
implications on P2P lending practice. 
Preliminary Investigation of Herding Behavior in a P2P Lending Marketplace  
Our preliminary investigation of P2P lending auctions provided the following results. One, there is evidence of 
herding in multi-winner auctions. Two, herding might have led to sub-optimal decisions that are costly for lenders, 
borrowers, and the P2P lending marketplace. 
We used publicly available data on Prosper (www.prosper.com) from 2/13/2007 to 10/15/2008. This time span was 
chosen because Prosper changed their credit grade categories on 2/12/2007, and suspended their lending activities in 
October 2008 in order to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and did not reopen until 9 
months later. The chosen time frame provides over one and half years of data for analysis of lender behavior when 
the practice on the marketplace is stable and consistent. 
Evidence of Herding 
Biding Concentration 
We found bidding concentrate with respect to listing options and timing. A lot of fully funded listings were over-
funded - bids total higher than requested amount. Over the time frame from 2/13/2007 to 10/15/2008, 78% of the 
21,337 listings that were fully funded received funds exceeding the requested amount, 50% received funding as high 
as 80% over the requested amount, some listings received funds over 200%. If listings that automatically closed 
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after getting 100% funding are left out, these numbers get even higher. Figure 1 shows that for listings that were 
open for the entire auction time 4% received 100% funding, which means 96% was overfunded.  
 
Figure 1. Percentage Funded of Fully Funded Listings 
 
While many listings received over funding, a large amount of listings did not receive much attention at all. Over the 
same time period, 146,844 listings did not receive enough funding and expired. As illustrated in Figure 2, over 80% 
of expired listings received less than 10% of the requested amount. It looks like if a listing did not receive enough 
bids to look promising to begin with, then it would not receive much attention afterwards and probably would 
simply go expired.  
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage Funded of Expired Listings 
 
Bidding also concentrated with respect to timing - listings received most of bids at the beginning and end of the 
auction. We draw a second sample from Prosper’s data. We extracted all bids placed in May 2008 on listings that 
are either completed or expired (i.e., stayed open till the end of the auction), from those we removed all bids from 
the states of TX, AE, and AE because these states had maximum borrower interest rate state caps that could skew 
our results. This resulted in 6,934 listings and 275,273 bids from 5,775 unique members. 
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In the time frame of our analysis, auction duration was seven days. Figure 3 depicts bidding activity by each hour of 
the auction duration. The figure shows a bipolar trend, peaking at the beginning and the end of the auctions. This 
implies that lenders favor biding at the beginning and the end of an auction, and remain dormant in the time 
between. This could indicate herding behavior and sniping as observed in other auction marketplaces such as eBay. 
Although bids are not placed during the last minutes of an auction like on eBay, we can see a substantial increase in 
bids placed in the last five hours. There could be two reasons for this behavior. First, lenders want to make sure that 
a listing gets fully funded and that their money is not locked into a listing for very long, supporting our arguments 
above. Second, lenders want to observe the behavior of others as an indicator for listing quality, supporting our 
arguments for informational cascades.  
 
Figure 3. Average Number of Bids Per Listing by Hour For Funded and Un-funded Listings 
 
Predicting the Likelihood of Getting another Bid  
The evidence above does not rule out the possibility that the concentrations on listings and auction time were due to 
lenders choosing to bid on attractive listings independently rather than following others. Therefore, we estimated 
hierarchical logit regression models to predict the likelihood of another bid on the listing at three different stages, 
when a listing is funded for no more than 10%, between 10 and 100%, and over 100%, and compared the 
explanatory power of the independent variables. We chose two groups of independent variables based on previous 
P2P lending research (Kumar 2007; Berger and Gleisner 2009; Everett 2008; Greiner and Wang, forthcoming; and 
Herzenstein et al. 2010). The first group of independent variables represents listing and borrower characteristics. 
The second group has one variable - the natural logarithm of the number of bids placed on the listing. 
Figure 4 presents the regression models. The first two rows report the adjusted R-squares of the regression models. 
When listings are funded for 10% or less (Model 1), listing and borrower characteristics explain 36.3% of the 
variation in the likelihood of another bid. Adding the logarithm of the number of current bids bared changes the 
explanatory power, a 1% increase. When listings are funded for over 10% and less than 100% (Model 2), the 
hierarchical regression shows that the explanatory power increases noticeably by adding the number of current bids 
into the model.  In other words, comparing to Model 1, the number of bids received is much more important in 
predicting the likelihood of another bid in Model 2. This means that when a listing is funded to a certain degree (in 
this case between 10% and 100%), lenders base their bidding decisions more on bids received and less on listing and 
borrower characteristics. After listings are fully funded (Model 3), the additional explanatory power of number of 
bids received drops. The same pattern can be seen in the variable coefficients (last row in the figure). The coefficient 
of the number of bids received increases from Model 1 (.424) to Model 2 (.975), indicating that the number of bids 
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received becomes a more important predictor after the listing has received certain amount of funding. When the 
listing is fully funded (Model 3), the coefficient becomes negative, a likely indication that lenders try not to compete 
on interest rate. 
 
Figure 4. Hierarchical Regressions for the Likelihood of another Bid 
 
The combination of the increase in explanatory power of the number of bids received and the decrease in listing and 
borrower characteristics provides strong evidence that the bidding concentration on listings is not due to individual 
lenders making independent decisions based on the listings; rather, it indicates that lenders look at how many others 
have already “voted” for a particular listing and then cast their votes accordingly, that is, at least until the listing gets 
fully funded. This result reconfirms the findings in Herzenstein et al. (2010) that the likelihood of attracting another 
bid increases with the number of bids received until a listing gets fully funded, after which it starts to decrease with 
the number of bids received. By controlling listing and borrower characteristics, this result provides strong evidence 
that the herding behavior is due to following others rather than coming to independent decisions based on private 
information. 
Influences of Herding 
The high concentration of bidding on certain listing options, while ignoring others, invariably led to a large sum of 
lender money being outbid. Over the same time frame, over $140 million worth of loans were generated, even more 
lender money (over $145 million) was outbid and loan requests (over $149 million) not funded (expired, cancelled, 
or withdrawn). Bids on expired listings counted for only $62,886,437, much less than outbid lender money. Outbid 
lender money is costly for all participants of P2P lending. For lenders, it results in unrecovered opportunity cost that 
includes wasted time and potential returns on loans that the lenders could win; for borrowers, it is a wasted resource 
that could generate more loans; and for the marketplace, it represents reduced revenue as a marketplace makes 
money on funded loans. The reasons behind this highly concentrated bidding behavior call for further investigation. 
From the lenders' point of view, this may be rational decision - to fund only those that have a chance to get funded 
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based on the number of bids the listings already received; or to get a good ROI if the listing offers an attractive 
interest rate. On the other hand, blindly following others may lead to sub-optimal decisions for lenders. 
Interest rate is a measure of return on investment, hence an indicator of the quality of lender decisions. Good 
investment decisions should be justified by risk-return ratios. Table 1 shows that in the time frame of this analysis, 
for all listings that remained open after getting fully funded, interest rates were bid down in all credit categories - on 
average final interest rates on the loans are lower than starting interest rates offered by borrowers on the listings. 
What is interesting is that the interest rates for some higher risk listings (the D, E, and HR categories, with HR 
stands for “high risk”) are as low as 1% (see column “Lowest Final Interest Rate), much lower than the “Average 
Final Interest Rate” for less risky listings (the A, AA, and B categories). A look at the distribution of the interest 
rates for different credit categories shows that the interest rates for the high risk loans (the HR category) are widely 
spread, some much lower than the group average (Figure 5). Why do some high risk listings get funded at relatively 
low interest rates? Is it related to the observed herding behavior? These questions remain to be answered by future 
research. 




Figure 5. Distribution of Bid-down Final Interest Rates for AA, D, and HR Listings 
 
Counterproductive herding behavior could also be indicated if interest rates are bidden down to below an average 
(assuming that lenders would compete until a risk-return balance is reached and that the average interest rate could 
be regarded as a measure of this risk-return balance). When looking at how much lenders bid down listing interest 
rates, we found the following: interest rates of 7,085 completed listings out of 7,755 were bid down; 44% of these 
listings started above the average interest rate of their corresponding credit grade category, and were downbid to 
below the average; 17% started below their corresponding average interest rate and were further downbid (on 
average they were downbid by 2,3%); 39% started above their corresponding average interest rate and were 
downbid but not to as low as below the average interest rate. If a listing is downbid, it can indicate rational behavior 
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as long as the interest rate is not bid down to below the average interest rate; but as soon as a listing is downbid to 
below this average, then non-rational behavior is indicated. 
Conclusion and Future Research Questions  
In summary, we found strong evidence of herding behavior in P2P lending marketplaces. When listings have been 
funded to a certain level, lenders start to follow in without paying much attention to the characteristics of the listing 
and borrower. Some listings were funded way over 100%, which led to outbid lender money and in some cases, 
interest rate being bid down significantly. For many listings that failed to attract enough bids to begin with, they may 
very likely go unnoticed and end up expired. Although there are strong reasons to herd in a multi-winner auction 
such as in a P2P lending setting, herding may still lead to negative consequences which include sub-optimal 
investment decisions, wasted investment opportunities, and unutilized resources.  
This preliminary investigation also leads to other questions about herding in P2P lending: 
• Why do some listings receive so much attention from lenders and other listings go completely unfunded? 
• If lenders tend to bid on listings that already received many bids, how do listings get funded in the first 
place? Is there some threshold listings have to take? 
• When is herding rational and when does it become non-rational and counterproductive for buyers? 
• What factors (antecedents) lead to non-rational herding?  
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